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DO COGNITIVE FALLACIES PREDICT BEHAVIOR WHEN NON-
PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLERS PLAY SLOT MACHINES AND 
VIDEO POKER? 
 
Weatherly, J.N. & Flannery-Woehl, K.A. 
University of North Dakota 
A popular notion found in the research literature is that gambling, and gambling 
problems, are associated with illogical beliefs.  The present study investigated 
whether peoples’ subscription to cognitive fallacies related to gambling would 
be significant predictors of their actual gambling behavior.  Twenty participants 
completed several questionnaires designed to assess cognitive fallacies related to 
gambling and then had the opportunity to gamble money on video poker and a 
slot machine.  Results showed that faulty beliefs were seldom significant predic-
tors of actual gambling behavior.  In the lone instance in which such beliefs 
predicted gambling, the predictive relationship was in the opposite direction as 
suggested by the literature (i.e., fallacious beliefs were associated with less 
gambling).  The present results therefore question the idea that cognitive falla-
cies lead to problem and/or pathological gambling. 
Keywords: Cognitive fallacies, Gambling, Video poker, Slot machine
_____________________
 
Gambling is a serious societal problem, 
with approximately 1 – 3% of the general 
population suffering from pathological gam-
bling (Petry, 2005).  Although this percentage 
is small, it represents millions of individuals.  
As a result, a large literature has emerged on 
gambling behavior, the factors that influence 
or lead to problem gambling, and potential 
treatments for individuals who display patho-
logical gambling (see Petry, 2005, for a 
review). 
One of the popular explanations for prob-
lem gambling is that certain individuals 
subscribe to faulty beliefs about games of 
chance and 
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their ability to play them.  Ladouceur, Syl-
vain, Boutin, and Doucet (2002), for instance, 
outline several such fallacies.  One is the illu-
sion of control (Langer, 1975); the idea that 
because one actively participates in the game 
of chance, one’s chances of winning have 
somehow been influenced.  Another is the 
independence of turns; the failure to under-
stand that the outcome of one gamble is often 
completely independent of the outcome of 
previous or subsequent gambles.  Still another 
is that of diminishing returns; the failure to 
understand that games of chance pay back at a 
rate lower than 100% and thus continuing to 
gamble increases one’s chances of losing, not 
winning. 
Although the idea that faulty reasoning or 
beliefs underlies problem gambling is a popu-
lar one, it is not without its critics.  For 
instance, Petry (2005) points out that such 
beliefs are not sufficient for understanding 
problem gambling. That is, pathological gam-
blers do tend to subscribe to such erroneous 
beliefs, but so too do a large percentage of 
individuals who are not pathological gam-
1
Weatherly and Flannery: Do Cognitive Fallacies Predict Behavior When NonPathological Gamb
Published by theRepository at St. Cloud State, 2009
8                                                  JEFFREY  N. WEATHERLY  ET AL.    
        
 
blers.  With that said, Petry does not rule out 
the possibility that these beliefs somehow 
contribute to problem gambling and even in-
corporates a cognitive component in her 
suggested treatment for problem gamblers. 
Some research (e.g., Joukhador, Blaszczynski, 
& Maccallum, 2004) has also suggested that 
problem gamblers may endorse erroneous 
beliefs to a greater degree than non-problem 
gamblers. 
There is evidence to suggest that fallacies 
contribute to gambling behavior.  For in-
stance, Dixon, Jackson, Delaney, Holten, and 
Crothers (2007) had participants play two 
concurrently available video poker games.  
The games were identical with the exception 
that, on one, the computer identified the opti-
mal cards to hold and discard while, on the 
other, no such information was provided.  
Twelve of the 13 participants demonstrated 
the illusion of control, showing a preference 
for playing the game in which they freely 
choose the cards to play.  Other research (e.g., 
Dixon, Hayes, & Ebbs, 1998) has demon-
strated similar results when participants play 
roulette in that they prefer to choose their own 
numbers rather than having the experimenter 
choose the numbers for them. 
However, not all research has demonstrated 
the illusion of control when people gamble.  
Dannewitz and Weatherly (2007) had partici-
pants play video poker across three separate 
sessions.  In one, participants could freely 
choose the cards that were played.  In another, 
the program identified the optimal cards to 
hold and discard, but participants were free to 
play the hand as they saw fit.  In the final 
condition, the program identified the optimal 
play and participants were required to play the 
hand as the program identified.  Results 
showed that participants gambled the most 
money when they had the least amount of 
control over the cards that were played. 
Similarly, mixed results also exist in the 
investigation of the fallacies of the independ-
ence of turns and diminishing returns.  
Weatherly and Meier (2008) had participants 
play a slot machine for money in two separate 
baseline sessions.  Prior to the third session, 
participants were provided with accurate in-
formation pertaining to the independence of 
returns, to diminishing returns, or both.  Par-
ticipants then gambled in two separate 
sessions.  Results demonstrated that providing 
participants accurate information regarding 
these fallacies significantly reduced gambling 
and that this decrease was sustained across 
both treatment sessions (i.e., the information 
was provided prior to the third session, but 
not the fourth), a finding that is consistent 
with the idea that these fallacies may influ-
ence gambling behavior. However, 
information on the independence of turns and 
on diminishing returns had a similar effect on 
participants’ gambling.  Furthermore, partici-
pants who received information on both 
fallacies did not show larger decreases in 
gambling than did the groups who only re-
ceived information regarding one fallacy.  
Thus, it is not possible to determine whether 
the information directly influenced partici-
pants’ subscription to these fallacies or 
whether the information simply served to suc-
cessfully convey the message “you shouldn’t 
gamble.” 
The present study took a different tack than 
previous ones.  In the present study, non-
pathological participants completed a series of 
questionnaires designed to determine how 
strongly they subscribed to certain cognitive 
fallacies.  Specifically, participants completed 
the Informational Biases Scale (IBS: Jefferson 
& Nicki, 2003), which was designed to assess 
erroneous beliefs such as the illusion of con-
trol, illusory correlations, and the gambler’s 
fallacy, the Superstitious Beliefs Scale (SBS; 
Joukhador et al., 2004), which was designed 
to assess erroneous beliefs about cause-and-
effect relationships between independent 
gambling outcomes, and the Gambling Re-
lated Cognitions Scale (GRCS; Raylu & Oei, 
2004), which purports to measure five cogni-
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tions related to gambling (interpretative con-
trol, predictive control, the illusion of control, 
perceived inability to cease/stop gambling, 
and expectancies).  Participants then gambled 
money on a slot machine and on video poker.  
If cognitive fallacies influence gambling be-
havior, then participants’ subscription to these 
fallacies should be predictive of their gam-
bling behavior.  Thus, one would predict that 
the more participants subscribed to these fal-
lacies (as measured by the above scales), the 





Participants were 20 undergraduate stu-
dents (10 female) recruited from the 
psychology department participant pool at the 
University of North Dakota.  In order to par-
ticipate, individuals had to be at least 21 years 
of age and score less than 5 on the South 
Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & 
Blume, 1987).  The mean age of the partici-
pants was 23.15 years (SD = 2.70 years).  
None of the participants was married.  Seven-
teen were Caucasian, one was American 
Indian, and two were African American.  All 
participants reported an annual income of 
$15,000 per year or less. 
 
Materials 
Participants completed a number of paper-
and-pencil measures.  The first was an in-
formed consent form as approved by the 
Institutional Review Board at the University 
of North Dakota.  The second was a demo-
graphic survey that asked participants their 
age, sex, ethnicity, marital status, and annual 
income.  This information was requested be-
cause these factors are potential risk factors 
for pathological gambling (Petry, 2005). 
The next measure was the SOGS (Lesieur 
& Blume, 1987), which consists of 20 ques-
tions that are related to an individual’s 
previous gambling experience and are based 
on the DSM-III criteria for pathological gam-
bling.  A score of 5 or more on the SOGS 
suggests the potential presence of pathology.  
The SOGS has been shown to have high in-
ternal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.97) 
and good test-retest reliability (r = .71; Le-
sieur & Blume, 1987). 
The next measure was the IBS (Jefferson & 
Nicki, 2003), which was designed to assess 
cognitive distortions related to gambling such 
as the illusion of control, illusory correlations, 
and the gambler’s fallacy.  Participants rate 
their agreement with each of 25 statements 
related to gambling on a Likert scale and 
scores are then summed across all responses, 
with higher scores indicating greater miscon-
ceptions related to the nature of randomness 
within a gambling scenario.  Jefferson and 
Nicki (2003) report the IBS has good internal 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92) and de-
cent construct validity when correlated with 
other measures of gambling.  The original 
IBS was slightly modified for use in the pre-
sent study.  The wording of the statements 
was altered so as to reflect gambling more 
generally, rather than specifically targeting 
use of video lottery terminals (VLTs) as was 
the case in the original measure. For example, 
the statement “I sometimes find myself trying 
to win back money that I have lost on VLTs” 
from the original IBS was changed to “I 
sometimes find myself trying to win back 
money that I have lost on gambling ma-
chines” for the present research. 
The next measure was the SBS (Joukhador 
et al., 2004), which is an eight-item scale de-
signed to measure superstitions related to 
cause-and-effect relationships in gambling.  
Participants are asked to rate how strongly 
they believe each item on a scale of zero to 
four, with higher scores indicating higher 
levels of superstition.  Joukhador et al. (2004) 
showed that problem gamblers endorsed more 
superstitions on the scale than did non-
problem gamblers.  However, internal consis-
3
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tency, test-retest reliability, and construct va-
lidity were not reported. 
The final measure was the GRCS (Raylu & 
Oei, 2004), which consists of 23 items that 
assess a variety of cognitions related to prob-
lematic gambling.  Participants respond to 
each statement on a Likert scale and a total 
score is calculated by summing the scores 
across all responses. Additionally, the GRCS 
contains 5 subscales. These subscales can be 
scored individually by summing the points 
associated with the set of statements related to 
each.  The subscales assess the (1) inability to 
stop gambling, (2) interpretive bias, (3) gam-
bling expectancies, (4) predictive control, and 
(5) illusion of control.  Raylu and Oei (2004) 
reported high overall reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.93) and moderate to high reliability 
of each subscale (Cronbach’s alphas ranged 
from 0.77 to 0.91). 
 
Apparatus and Settings 
When participants played a slot machine, 
they played a Triple Diamond machine (IGT 
Inc.) that was located with two other slot ma-
chines in a windowless room measuring 
approximately 1.5 m X 5 m.  The machine 
allowed the player to bet one or two coins per 
play.  Outcomes of individual spins were not 
preset (i.e., predetermined).  The overall pay-
back percentage for the machine was 87%, 
meaning that it was programmed to pay an 
average of 87 tokens for every 100 bet over 
an indefinite period of time.  An internal 
counter measured the number of tokens in-
serted and the number of tokens dispensed 
when wins occurred.  The visual displays on 
the machine indicated that it took 25-cent 
coins.  However, the machine was repro-
grammed to accept tokens that, in the present 
study, were worth five cents each.  Thus, the 
“25¢” displays were covered with “5¢” dis-
plays.  Two other slot machines were not used 
in the present study and were turned off. 
When participants played video poker, they 
did so in a windowless room that measured 
approximately 2 m by 2 m.  The room con-
tained a table and two chairs, with a personal 
computer situated on the table.  The video-
poker software (Zamzow Software Solutions, 
2003) on the computer allowed for a variety 
of five-card-draw poker games to be played.  
The present experiment utilized “Loose 
Deuces.”  In this five-card poker game, 2s 
were wild and the player’s bet was returned 
for a hand of Three-of-a-Kind (three cards of 
the same face value, e.g., three Jacks).  In-
creasing payoffs occurred for increasingly 
better poker hands.  Loose Deuces was cho-
sen relative to other possible games (e.g., 
Jacks or Better) because research (Weatherly, 
Austin, & Farwell, 2007) has demonstrated 
that players play this game less accurately 
than other games and thus this game allowed 
for a greater variation in participants’ accu-
racy of play.  Participants could bet one to 
five credits per hand.  The software recorded 
number of hands played, number of credits 
bet, and accuracy of play (see Jackson, 2007). 
 
Procedure 
All data were collected in a single session.  
Upon the participant’s arrival, the researcher 
checked the participant’s driver’s license to 
ensure that the participant was at least 21 
years of age.  Participants then went through 
the process of providing informed consent.  
Next, they completed the paper-and-pencil 
measures, beginning with the SOGS.  While 
the participant was completing the other 
measures, the researcher scored the SOGS.  
The participant was dismissed if s/he scored 5 
or more on the SOGS.  One participant had to 
be dismissed for scoring 5 or more; that par-
ticipant was replaced. 
Upon completion of the questionnaires, the 
participant was given the opportunity to play 
the slot machine and video poker, with the 
order of these games counterbalanced across 
participants.  Prior to gambling on each game, 
the researcher read the following instructions: 
You will now be given the opportunity 
to play on a slot machine (video 
4
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poker). You will be given 100 tokens 
(credits) worth five cents each. Thus, 
you are being given five dollars to 
gamble. You may bet as many tokens 
(credits) per play as the machine al-
lows. Your goal should be to end the 
session with as many tokens (credits) 
as you can. You may end the session 
at anytime by informing the researcher 
that you would like to end the session. 
The session will end when a) you quit 
playing, b) you run out of tokens 
(credits), or c) 20 minutes has elapsed. 
At the end of the experiment you will 
be paid in cash for the number of to-
kens (credits) you have left or have 
accumulated. Do you have any ques-
tions?  
 
Questions were answered by repeating the 
above instructions.  When playing the slot 
machine, the researcher then gave the partici-
pant 100 tokens.  When participants played 
video poker, 100 credits were already loaded 
into the game.  The participant played the first 
game until one of the above criteria was met.  
The researcher then took the participant to the 
next room, read the above instructions, and 
the participant played the second game until 
one of the above criteria was met.  After play-
ing the second game, the researcher debriefed 
the participant, paid the participant for the 
number of credits s/he had accumulated or 
had remaining after playing both games, pro-
vided extra-course credit for participation (if 
applicable), and dismissed the participant. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents a summary of participants’ 
scores on the questionnaires and their overall 
gambling behavior.  In terms of gambling, all 
participants played at least one hand of video 
poker and all but one gambled on the slot 
machine.  A series of related-samples t tests 
indicated that the average number of trials 
played (t(19) = -1.92), number of cred-
its/tokens bet (t(19) = 1.31), and amount won 
(t(19) = 1.40) did not differ between video 
poker and the slot machine.  The number 
credits won on video poker was significantly 
correlated with both the number of hands 
played (r = .544, p = .016) and total number 
of credits bet (r = .726, p < .001). The number 
of coins won on the slot machine was signifi-
cantly correlated with both the number of 
spins played (r = .785, p < .001) and the num-
ber of tokens bet (r = .826, p < .001).  These 
results, and all that follow, were considered 
significant at p<.05. 
A series of linear regressions were con-
ducted, using the various measures of 
cognitive fallacies (IBS, SBS, GRCS) as pre-
dictors of gambling behavior (e.g., tokens bet, 
hands played).  None of the cognitive meas-
ures were significant predictors of the number 
of hands played during video poker, the accu-
racy of play on video poker, the number of 
spins played on the slot machine, or the num-
ber of tokens bet on the slot machine (all Fs < 
1).  The only significant predictor was found 
for the total number of credits bet on video 
poker, which was participants’ score on the 
IBS (F(1, 18) = 7.69, p = .013, R2 = .299). 
Greater misconceptions related to the nature 
of randomness within a gambling scenario 
predicted fewer coins played during the poker 
session (β = -.547). 
Several significant correlations existed be-
tween the different paper-and-pencil 
measures.  Specifically, participants’ scores 
on the IBS was significantly correlated with 
their scores on the SOGS (r = -.537, p = 
.018), the gambling expectancies subscale of 
the GRCS (r = .465, p = .045), the predictive 
control subscale of the GRCS (r = .483, p = 
.034), the total score on the GRCS (r = .483, p 
= .036), and the SBS (r = -.718, p = .001). 
 
DISCUSSION 
The present study was designed to investi-
gate the relationship found in the research 
literature between cognitive fallacies and 
gambling.  Non-pathological participants 
completed a number of questionnaires de-
signed to assess cognitive fallacies related to 
gambling and then had the opportunity to  
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gamble money on video poker and a slot ma-
chine.  In general, participants’ subscription 
to cognitive fallacies was not a significant 
predictor of how they gambled, with one ex-
ception.  Specifically, the greater the 
misconception participants had about the con-
cept of randomness, the less money they 
gambled on video poker, a result that is in the 
opposite direction of that predicted by the 
research literature. 
These results do not question the relation-
ship between cognitive fallacies and gambling 
that is found in the research literature, but 
they do suggest that this relationship is not 
causal.  That is, if cognitive fallacies lead to 
gambling problems, then you would expect 
that the degree to which people subscribe to 
these fallacies would predict how people 
gamble. 
Despite broadly surveying a number of dif-


























gambling, the present study found no such 
predictive relationship.  In that respect, the 
present results are consistent with Petry’s 
(2005) conclusion that such beliefs are not 
sufficient for problem gambling to occur 
given that many non-problem gamblers also 
hold such beliefs. 
One could argue that the present results are 
silent to the issue of the relationship between 
cognitive fallacies and pathological gambling 
because the current study did not study patho-
logical gamblers.  While it is true that it 
remains possible that cognitive fallacies may 
predict actual gambling behavior in patho-
logical gamblers, the present results still 
question that such fallacies lead to gambling 
problems.  If they did, then their effect on 
gambling should be noticeable before, not 
after, one becomes a pathological gambler. 
One could also argue that the present 
measures were not meant to be predictive in 
  Table 1.  Descriptive statistics for the questionnaires and gambling measures. 
 






   Inability to stop 
   Interpretive bias 
   Gambling expectancies 
   Predictive control 
   Illusion of control 




    0.65 
110.80 
    3.50 
 
  34.45 
  24.90 
  25.60 
  37.15 
  27.05 
149.15 
 
   0.88 
 28.17 
   3.68 
 
   1.40 
   2.97 
   2.52 
   3.51 
   1.61 
   9.74 
Hands Played   45.05   30.42 
Coins Played 152.16 128.13 
Percent Correct   45.57   19.79 
Coins paid (dollar amount)   92.32 ($4.62) 100.67 ($5.03) 
   
Slot Machine   
Number of spins   66.16   51.31 
Coins Played 102.05   92.78 
Coins paid (dollar amount)   84.68 ($4.23)   63.27 ($3.16) 
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nature, but rather were designed to assess pre-
existing factors.  On the other hand, one could 
argue that the measures are in fact predictive, 
but the present procedure lacked sufficient 
power to identify their predictive capabilities.  
The former argument cannot be refuted, but if 
these measures are not ultimately able to pre-
dict future behavior, then their overall utility 
is limited.  In response to the latter argument, 
we can say that none of the present measures, 
even when tested alone, were significant pre-
dictors of more gambling on any of the 
present dependent measures.  Furthermore, if 
extremely large numbers are required to dem-
onstrate a significant effect, then again the 
utility of these measures to inform us about 
the behavior of individuals is limited. 
With that said, the present design did have 
a number of limitations.  Only 20 participants 
were tested, so it is indeed possible that statis-
tically significant effects would have been 
observed if more participants had been em-
ployed.  It is also the case that the present 
procedure did not prescreen for different 
populations pertaining to cognitive fallacies.  
That is, had we specifically targeted partici-
pants who varied widely in their beliefs 
pertaining to gambling, it is possible that such 
beliefs may have been significant predictors 
of gambling behavior.  However, if the latter 
point was true, then the present results sug-
gest that minor differences in beliefs toward 
gambling are not likely to predict differences 
in gambling.  We also did not test for predic-
tive relationships with individual items on the 
different scales.  We did not do so because 
our intention was to use the measures as they 
had been originally intended. 
One could also argue that the present re-
sults lack external validity because 
participants were not gambling their own 
money.  The present results cannot address 
this argument.  However, the research litera-
ture can.  For example, research on the 
“endowment effect” has shown that, when 
people are gifted with something such as 
money, they take ownership of it and treat it 
as if it were their own (e.g., Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990).  Furthermore, sev-
eral studies from our laboratory (Weatherly & 
Brandt, 2004; Weatherly & Meier, 2007) have 
demonstrated that participants gambling with 
money that has been staked to them do so 
more conservatively than when what they are 
“gambling” has no value.  These findings 
support the idea that participants valued the 
money that had been staked. 
Despite the mostly null results of the pre-
sent study, they join a host of recent 
experimental studies on gambling that help 
highlight the need for more experimentally 
based research on gambling.  For instance, 
despite decades of reports of a “big win” early 
in a gambler’s career leading to problem 
gambling later on (Custer, 1984; Custer & 
Milt, 1985), only one empirically based re-
search study has reported an effect of a “big 
win” (Weatherly, Sauter, & King, 2004) and 
that effect was in the opposite direction as 
proposed in the literature.  Likewise, the lit-
erature is rife with reports that distorted 
cognitive beliefs lead to gambling problems.  
The field would be wise to recognize that 
these reports are correlational in nature and 
have been found in pre-existing populations.  
Additional experimental research should be 
conducted before these relationships are 
raised to the levels of importance that many in 
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